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Forgetting constrains the emergence of cooperative  
decision strategies
Jeffrey R. Stevens1*, Jenny Volstorf1, Lael J. Schooler1 and Jörg Rieskamp1,2
1 Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
2 Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
Theoretical studies of cooperative behavior have focused on decision strategies that depend on 
a partner’s last choices. The findings from this work assume that players accurately remember 
past actions. The kind of memory that these strategies employ, however, does not reflect what 
we know about memory. Here, we show that human memory may not meet the requirements 
needed to use these strategies. When asked to recall the previous behavior of simulated partners 
in a cooperative memory task, participants performed poorly, making errors in 10–24% of the 
trials. Participants made more errors when required to track more partners. We conducted 
agent-based simulations to evaluate how well cooperative strategies cope with error. These 
simulations suggest that, even with few errors, cooperation could not be maintained at the 
error rates demonstrated by our participants. Our results indicate that the strategies typically 
used in the study of cooperation likely do not reflect the underlying cognitive capacities used 
by humans and other animals in social interactions. By including unrealistic assumptions about 
cognition, theoretical models may have overestimated the robustness of the existing cooperative 
strategies. To remedy this, future models should incorporate what we know about cognition.
Keywords: agent-based simulation, cooperation, decision strategy, forgetting, memory, prisoner’s dilemma, tit-for-tat
memory requests. The so-called memory-1 strategies require that 
players accurately remember the single last choice from each part-
ner. Memory-2 strategies require accurate memory for the last two 
choices. Humans and other animals, however, sometimes forget. If 
an individual cannot remember the past action of an interaction 
partner, then he or she cannot apply a strategy that relies on this 
knowledge.
In contrast to the existing cooperative strategies, our memory 
does not work like computer memory, filing away pieces of infor-
mation for flawless retrieval later. Instead, our memory func-
tions more like how a search engine retrieves information from 
the internet, with memory records associated to retrieval cues 
(Estes, 1955; Anderson et al., 2004), much like how websites are 
indexed by keywords. This associative nature of memory leads 
to problems of interference, in which cues become associated 
with many memories, hindering the retrieval of the information 
sought. Our memory suffers from both proactive interference, in 
which old memories disrupt the retrieval of new information, and 
retroactive interference, in which new memories disrupt retrieval 
of old information.
Despite its central importance, the role of memory in coopera-
tion has received little attention in the existing literature. In one 
of the few studies to explore memory and cooperation, Milinski 
and Wedekind (1998) examined the effects of working memory on 
cooperation by giving half of their participants a working memory 
task between interactions. They found that without the memory 
task, participants seemed to use a more complicated memory-2 
strategy, whereas with the memory interference, they used a sim-
pler memory-1, TFT-like strategy. Winkler et al. (2008) introduced 
multiple partners to track, as well as varied the interaction pattern 
1 IntroductIon
Theoretical analyses have demonstrated that cooperation can 
evolve in situations in which individuals interact repeatedly and 
their behavior depends on other’s and/or their own past behav-
ior (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006). For instance, 
the celebrated decision strategy tit-for-tat (TFT) cooperates on 
the first move with a partner and then copies the partner’s single 
last choice (cooperate or defect) on all subsequent interactions 
(Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). 
This and similar strategies, such as generous TFT (GTFT), con-
trite TFT (CTFT), tit-for-two-tats (TF2T), and win-stay/lose-
shift (WSLS; Boyd, 1989; Kraines and Kraines, 1989; Nowak and 
Sigmund, 1992), have dominated theoretical studies of coopera-
tion for the last 30 years. Despite their dominance in the theoretical 
work, the assumptions about the underlying cognition required 
to implement these strategies have not been adequately tested. 
Thus, there is a critical gap between the theoretical work on which 
decision strategies can maintain cooperation and the empirical 
work on what strategies individuals actually use. To bridge this 
gap, we must test whether the cognitive capacities required to 
implement strategies are psychologically plausible (Stephens et al., 
2002; Hammerstein, 2003; Stevens and Hauser, 2004; Stevens et al., 
2005; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2007). Here, we investigate one of these 
cognitive capacities: memory for past actions. We ask whether 
existing strategies make reasonable assumptions about memory 
or whether problems associated with forgetting could constrain 
the emergence of these cooperative strategies.
Memory represents a primary cognitive capacity needed for 
strategies in social interactions that depend on past behavior. The 
strategies tested in the literature for social interaction make  different 
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2 cooperatIve memory experIment
2.1 methods
We recruited 216 participants (age: mean ± SD = 25.4 ± 3.2 years, 
range = 18–36 years) drawn from Berlin universities via the Max 
Planck Institute for Human Development participant pool. We 
prepared all materials in German and programmed the experiment 
in E-prime experimental software (Schneider et al., 2002). The 
program began by asking participants to provide demographic data 
(sex, age, educational level, occupation, college major).
Before beginning the experiment, participants received a paper 
copy of instructions (see Participant Instructions in Appendix) 
describing the goal of the task: recall the last action (cooperate or 
not cooperate) for each simulated partner. Participants returned the 
instructions to the experimenter before continuing to avoid giving 
them a means to record information during the task. A practice phase 
familiarized participants with the experiment. The practice phase was 
identical to the actual experimental session, except (1) it used fewer 
trials in a fixed order for all participants (three partners with four 
interactions each and six partners with three interactions each), (2) 
it included only female partners (the experimental phases included 
only male partners), and (3) the money earned did not accumulate 
for the final payment. At the end of the practice session, participants 
received feedback concerning their success (“You have accomplished 
the practice session with x out of 21 correct answers.”).
Following the practice phase, participants experienced one of 
the nine experimental conditions (24 participants – 12 males and 
12 females – in each condition) that differed in the number of 
simulated partners per group (5, 10, or 15 partners) and the number 
of interactions with each partner (5, 10, or 15 interactions). To 
keep the number of trials as similar as possible for each partici-
pant, we replicated some of the conditions several times until the 
participants experienced between 150 and 225 trials. Thus, some 
conditions had only one replicate, whereas others had up to six 
replicates (Table 1).
Each replicate consisted of a series of rounds, each with a dif-
ferent set of partner names and images. Participants met with each 
partner once in a randomized order per round. In the first round, we 
presented individually for each partner a photograph, a name, and 
an action: for instance, “Ulrich cooperates” (Figure 1). All partners 
were male, and we randomized partner names and photos across 
participants. Participants viewed each partner’s information for 5 s 
between repeatedly interacting the same partner before switching to 
a new one or randomly interacting with partners. When randomly 
interacting with partners, participants with better recall of bio-
graphical information about their partners received higher payoffs 
in the cooperative games – better memory abilities at the individual 
level resulted in higher payoffs. These studies either measured or 
manipulated memory performance for information outside of the 
cooperative situation. Here, we test the role of memory for partners’ 
previous actions on cooperation.
Given the nature of memory, we ask whether existing decision 
strategies that promote cooperation (such as TFT and its vari-
ants) are cognitively feasible. We explore whether humans have 
the memory capacity required to implement these strategies. Thus, 
we are asking whether individuals can use strategies like TFT, not 
whether they do use these strategies. Do they have the requisite 
cognitive capacity? To address this capacity question, we designed 
a memory experiment that tested the role of memory interference 
on the ability to recall past actions. Though this study does not 
mimic real-world cooperative situations, it is not meant to. Our 
experimental design replicates the conditions under which mem-
ory-1 and -2 strategies should work in order to test the underlying 
cognitive assumptions of these strategies.
We conducted an experiment with human participants, in 
which a series of simulated partners chose to cooperate or defect. 
We measured participants’ memory accuracy in recalling each 
partner’s last action. To test the effects of memory interference 
on cooperation, we implemented two experimental manipula-
tions. First, we varied the number of simulated partners, which 
is critical when interactions between different partners are inter-
leaved (e.g., partner A, partner B, partner C, partner A, etc.). In 
this case, an individual may forget a specific partner’s previous 
behavior due to the intervening interactions interfering with the 
retrieval of the memory; more partners result in more retroac-
tive interference. Second, we varied the number of interactions 
with each partner because more previous interactions might 
interfere with the ability to recall only the single last interac-
tion (proactive interference). From these manipulations, we can 
estimate how memory errors respond to increases in proactive 
and retroactive interference.
Estimates of memory accuracy alone, however, do not demon-
strate the complete role of memory in cooperation. We must also 
test how well specific decision strategies cope with error caused 
by misremembering a partner’s last actions. For instance, TFT’s 
performance decreases when errors exist because mistakenly defect-
ing results in the lower payoffs of mutual defection (Molander, 
1985). A more forgiving form of TFT called CTFT (Boyd, 1989) 
outperforms TFT when individuals make errors. Although a few 
strategies have been tested over a few error rates (e.g., Stephens 
et al., 1995; Wu and Axelrod, 1995; Rieskamp and Todd, 2006), to 
our knowledge there exists no comprehensive treatment of error on 
the memory-1 and -2 strategies. We used agent-based simulations 
to systematically analyze the success of several strategies proposed 
in the literature across a broader range of error rates. With these 
and the human memory results in hand, we can determine whether 
currently proposed decision strategies provide adequate models of 
cooperative behavior.
Table 1 | Experimental conditions.
Condition # Partners Interactions Replicates Total trials
1 5 5 6 150
2 5 10 3 150
3 5 15 2 150
4 10 5 3 150
5 10 10 2 200
6 10 15 1 150
7 15 5 2 150
8 15 10 1 150
9 15 15 1 225
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screen, participants viewed the new action of the current part-
ner for 5 s before advancing to the next partner. In between 
rounds, participants could pause the program and start a new 
round at their discretion. Afterward, participants completed a 
questionnaire asking what kinds of strategies they used to solve 
the memory task, as well as how often they guessed and how 
often they thought the partners cooperated. Participants received 
0.05 euros for each correct answer and 5 euros for showing up, 
earning an average of 11.05 euros (approximately 14 US dol-
lars) per person (range = 8.25–14.60 euros). We analyzed the 
data using R statistical software version 2.12.0 (R Development 
Core Team, 2010) and the epicalc (Chongsuvivatwong, 2010), 
Hmisc (Harrell, 2010), and lattice (Sarkar, 2008) packages. The 
original document for this paper used Sweave (Leisch, 2002) to 
embed the R code into the document, thus ensuring reproduc-
ible research (de Leeuw, 2001). Data and R code are available in 
the Supplemental Data.
before advancing to the next partner (1 s in between partners). For 
every trial in the experimental phase, we randomly assigned the 
partner’s action as cooperate or defect, so participants could not 
associate a pattern of action with each partner and had to track the 
exact behavior of each partner in the previous round.
After viewing all members of one group, participants began 
the retrieval rounds, with a randomized order of partners in each 
round. We presented the image of the partners, along with the 
question “What did (name) do last time?”. The participant had 
10 s to answer by pressing “k” or “n” [“kooperiert” (“cooperate”) 
or “nicht kooperiert” (“did not cooperate”)] on the keyboard. If 
they responded within 10 s, they received a feedback screen for 
3 s stating whether they were correct, the amount of money they 
received for that trial (only if they were correct), and an updated 
total amount received so far in the experiment. If they failed to 
respond in time, the participant did not receive feedback, only a 
reminder to respond more quickly next time. After the  feedback 
FIguRE 1 | Screen shots of the cooperative memory task. In the first 
round of the task (top row), participants observed an image and the name 
of each partner, along with the current action. After viewing this for each 
partner, participants were asked for a partner’s previous choice, given 
feedback on his or her response, and updated on the partner’s new 
choice before moving on to the next partner (middle and bottom rows). 
Numbers below screens give presentation times for screens and 
between screens.
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 interaction, however, error rates doubled. With more intervening 
events, errors continued to increase but at different levels for 5 
partners compared to 10 and 15 partners.
With these data, we could estimate a function describing how 
forgetting increased with the number of intervening interac-
tions. When combining the participants experiencing 10 and 15 
partners, these data were well described by the power function 
p = 1 − 92(1 + n)−0.08 (R2 = 0.90), where p represents the probability 
of an error and n represents the number of intervening interactions. 
A similar analysis on the five-partner data yielded the power func-
tion p = 1 − 96(1 + n)−0.04 (R2 = 0.90). We used a modified version 
of Wickelgren’s (1974) function because it predicts memory data 
well (Wixted and Carpenter, 2007).
We also examined whether experiencing 5, 10, or 15 interac-
tions with each partner influenced error rates. Surprisingly, the 
number of interactions did not influence performance (Figure 2). 
An examination of the trend in error rates across the course of the 
experimental session suggests a general learning effect. Participant 
errors increased in early rounds, indicating that more interac-
tions caused more mistakes (Figure 4). Yet, in later rounds, per-
formance almost returned to first-round levels, perhaps due to 
the participants’ developing particular mnemonic strategies. In a 
questionnaire after the experiment (see Participant Questionnaire 
in Appendix), we asked participants to describe any strategies that 
they used during the cooperative memory task. A common strategy 
was to memorize either the cooperators or defectors and then infer 
the other. Also, participants frequently tried to focus on either posi-
tive (for cooperate) or negative (for defect) features of the faces or 
applied additional letters to the names (e.g., when Tim cooperates, 
remember Timk or Timko). Some elaborate strategies generated 
stories (e.g., “I eventually imagined that all the cooperating partners 
were members of my ‘gang’ and tried to talk myself into  disliking the 
For the photographs of partners, we used images from Ebner 
(2008) downloaded from the Center for Vital Longevity: http://
vitallongevity.utdallas.edu/stimuli/facedb/categories/neutralized-
faces-by-natalie-ebner.html. We used 9 images of females for the 
practice phase and 31 images of males for the experimental phase. 
The depicted persons ranged between 18 and 32 years old, with the 
same background and color of clothing (Ebner, 2008). For part-
ner names, we used 40 of the most common male German names 
from 1958 to 2000 (retrieved from http://www.gfds.de/vornamen/
beliebteste-vornamen/).
2.2 results
As shown in Figure 2, participants made more errors as group 
size increased. With a group size of 5 partners, participants made 
errors in a mean (± 95% confidence interval) of 9.5 ± 2.3% of trials, 
whereas with 10 and 15 partners, they made errors in 22.5 ± 2.5% 
and 24.0 ± 2.5% of trials respectively. Participants performed fairly 
accurately at the smallest group size, but once required to track 10 
or more partners, memory errors increased dramatically. In fact, 
the error rates in the 10- and 15-partner conditions suggest that 
participants were guessing in half of the trials. Thus, retroactive 
interference from tracking multiple partners sharply increased 
memory errors in this task.
To further explore this memory interference, we examined error 
as a function of the number of intervening interactions. Between 
consecutive presentations of the same partner, there were other 
intervening partners. Because we randomized the order of pres-
entation of partners within a round structure, we had variation 
in the number of intervening interactions and could test whether 
more intervening events resulted in worse memory performance. 
When consecutive interactions with the same partner occurred with 
no intervening interactions, participants performed well, with a 
mean error rate below 10% (Figure 3). With even one intervening 
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FIguRE 2 | Memory error rate as a function of partner number and 
number of interactions. Boxplots show that the error rate increased with 
group size (N = 24 participants in each of nine conditions). The number of 
interactions per partner, however, did not influence error rate. Diamonds 
represent the mean, lines represent the median, boxes represent the 
interquartile range, and whiskers represent 1.5 times the interquartile range.
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FIguRE 3 | Interference effects on memory accuracy. The mean (±SEM) 
error rate increased with more intervening interactions across all three group 
sizes (collapsing across the number of interactions per partner), with the effect 
more pronounced in group sizes of 10 or 15. The smooth lines represent the 
least-squares best-fit Wickelgren’s (1974) power function of memory to either 
the 5-partner data or combined 10- and 15-partner data (for both lines, 
R 2 = 0.90).
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repeated this procedure (with replacement) until we populated the 
next generation with 99 agents. In 2% of the reproductive events, 
we randomly mutated the chosen strategy to one of the eight other 
strategies. We continued to produce new generations until all agents 
in a population played a single strategy. Simulations stopped when 
the entire population consisted of one strategy.
We introduced error into the simulation by varying the prob-
ability of an agent “misremembering” – that is, remembering that 
the partner chose the opposite of what it actually chose – in six 
of the strategies: CTFT, GRIM, GTFT, TFT, TF2T, and WSLS. For 
strategies using multiple previous actions from the partner (CTFT, 
TF2T), each memory had an independent probability of error. 
No memory was necessary for ALLC, ALLD, and RAND, and we 
assumed perfect memory for the agent’s own action in CTFT and 
WSLS. We varied the error rate from 0 to 50% in 1% increments 
and conducted 1,000 simulations at each of the 51 increments. 
We report the proportion of the 1,000 replications in which each 
strategy dominated the population (i.e., the remaining strategy in 
the final generation).
3.2 results
In the cooperative memory task, even when explicitly rewarded 
for recalling the last action of their partners, participants made 
mistakes in 10–24% of trials. Though these error rates seem quite 
high given that chance performance in this task is 50%, we need a 
criterion for determining whether decision strategies can maintain 
cooperation at the error rates demonstrated by our participants. To 
determine whether the existing decision strategies can cope with 
this level of error, we assessed how well these strategies performed 
when making mistakes in an agent-based simulation. Figure 5 
shows for each error rate (1) the performance for each strategy 
(mean proportion of simulations in which each strategy outcom-
peted all other strategies) and (2) the proportion of interactions 
in the last generation in which the agents cooperated. At low error 
rates, GRIM – a strategy that begins by cooperating, then perma-
nently switches to defection following the partner’s first defection – 
outperformed all other strategies. Though at odds with Axelrod and 
Hamilton’s (1981) original results, this finding replicated results 
from Linster (1992) in which GRIM dominated the populations in 
the absence of errors. Additionally, ALLD, WSLS, TFT, and CTFT 
won a small percentage of the simulations. As error rates increased, 
ALLD and GRIM outcompeted TFT and the other cooperative 
strategies. The frequency of cooperative acts employed by all agents 
in the population decreased dramatically as errors became more 
prevalent. This decrease in cooperation reflected how the various 
strategies such as GRIM switched from cooperating to defecting 
when memory errors increased. Thus, cooperation could not be 
sustained, even at low levels of error.
‘traitors’”). It appears as though participants used specific strate-
gies to help in recall, which may account for the decrease in error 
rates over trials.
Males and females did not differ in their error rates (males: 
19.2 ± 0.6%; females: 18.8 ± 0.6%), and participants experienced 
similar error rates for cooperation and defection actions (coopera-
tion: 19.2 ± 0.6%; defection: 18.8 ± 0.6%), suggesting no preferential 
memory for defectors or “cheaters” in this context (Cosmides and 
Tooby, 1989; Mealey et al., 1996).
Because both the images and names used as stimuli in this 
experiment varied in terms of attractiveness (Rudolph et al., 2007; 
Ebner, 2008), we examined the mean memory performance aggre-
gated over all participants for the images and names that were rated 
for attractiveness. Attractiveness, however, did not correlate with 
memory performance for the images (N = 40, r = −0.21, p = 0.19) 
or names (N = 19, r = −0.10, p = 0.69).
3 sImulatIon analysIs
3.1 methods
We conducted a set of agent-based simulations in Pascal (code is 
available in the Supplemental Data) in which each agent interacted 
in a series of repeated prisoner’s dilemma games (Table 2). In the 
simulations, agents used one of nine strategies in the interactions 
(Table 3): always cooperate (ALLC), always defect (ALLD), CTFT, 
GTFT, grim trigger (GRIM), random (RAND), TFT, TF2T, and 
WSLS, also known as Pavlov. The population consisted of 11 agents 
of each strategy type, resulting in 99 total agents. Based on one of 
the conditions from the experiment, agents interacted with 10 ran-
domly chosen partners for 10 interaction rounds. After completing 
all interactions, we summed the payoffs over all interactions for each 
agent in the population. To generate a new population, we ranked 
all agents by their total fitness and accumulated the total population 
fitness, starting at the lowest-ranked agent. We then randomly chose 
(with equal probability) one number from 0 to the accumulated 
population fitness. The strategy of the agent associated with that 
randomly chosen number was added to the next generation. We 
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FIguRE 4 | Error rate as a function of round number. The mean (±SEM) 
error rate increased in the first three or four rounds before decreasing.
Table 2 | Prisoner’s dilemma matrix.
 Against
  Cooperate Defect
Payoff to Cooperate R = 3 S = 0
 Defect T = 5 P = 1
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Table 3 | Strategy descriptions.
Strategy Description (with computer implementation and game-theoretical definition)
ALLC Always cooperate. 
(all cooperate) Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (1, 1, 1, 1)
ALLD Always defect. 
(all defect) Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (0, 0, 0, 0)
CTFT Cooperate in the first round, then copy partner’s choice in previous round. If agent mistakenly defects, switch to cooperating 
(contrite TFT)  if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
  if partner cooperated in previous move, cooperate
  if partner defected in previous move & this is your second or third  
     interaction with partner, defect
  if partner defected in previous move & this is your fourth or more  
     interaction with partner, look at own move before previous move:
    if you cooperated, defect
    if you defected, look at partner’s second previous move:
       if partner cooperated, cooperate
       if partner defected, defect
 No game-theoretical definition – memory-2 strategy
GRIM Cooperate until partner defects, then always defect. 
(grim trigger   if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate 
or Friedman)  if partner defected in previous round, defect
  if partner cooperated in previous round, look at own previous move:
    if you cooperated, cooperate
    if you defected, defect
 Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (0, 1, 0, 0)
GTFT Cooperate in the first round, then copy partner’s choice in previous round. If partner defected, cooperate with probability 0.33. 
(generous TFT)  if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
  if partner cooperated in previous round, cooperate
  if partner defected in previous round, defect with probability 0.66
 Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (1, 1, 0.33, 0.33)
RAND (random) Randomly choose to cooperate or defect for each round.
 Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)
TFT (tit-for-tat) Cooperate in the first round, then copy partner’s choice in previous round. 
  if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
  if partner defected in previous round, defect
  if partner cooperated in previous round, cooperate
 Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (1, 1, 0, 0)
TF2T Cooperate in the first two rounds, then copy partner’s choice in previous round. If partner defected, look back  
(tit-for-two-tats) another round, and if partner defected then, defect, otherwise cooperate. 
  if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
  if partner cooperated in previous round, cooperate
  if partner defected in previous round & this is your second interaction  
     with partner, cooperate
  if partner defected in previous round & this is your third or more  
     interaction with partner, look at round before:
    if partner cooperated, cooperate
    if partner defected, defect
 No game-theoretical definition – memory-2 strategy
WSLS (win-stay,  Cooperate following mutual cooperation or mutual defection, otherwise defect. 
lose-shift or Pavlov)  if this is first interaction with partner, cooperate
  if you cooperated and partner cooperated, cooperate
(Continued)
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To further assess the role of error on cooperation, we embedded 
the forgetting functions from our experimental data into the agents 
in our simulation. Instead of using a fixed error rate as in the previ-
ous simulation, we conducted a simulation in which the error rate 
depended on the number of intervening interactions, and we drew 
that error rate from the fitted forgetting function from the memory 
experiment. All other aspects of the simulation were the same as 
above, and we conducted 1,000 replications of this simulation.
Using this forgetting function to assign memory error as a func-
tion of number of intervening events yielded results similar to the 
fixed-rate analysis. ALLD won around 83.0% of the simulations while 
GRIM won 17.0%, and only 6.2% of interactions involved coopera-
tion. Even when using a lower-error forgetting function based on 
the five-partner condition of the experiment, only strategies ALLD 
and GRIM performed well (winning 74.5 and 24.5% of the simula-
tions, respectively), and we observed cooperation rates of 12.8%. The 
cooperative strategies that depend on memory of partners’ last action 
failed when confronted with a realistic,  forgetful memory.
4 Game-theoretIcal analysIs
To verify our agent-based simulation results, we also used analyti-
cal methods to assess the role of error on cooperation by applying 
evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982). Evolutionary 
game-theoretical analyses seek an evolutionarily stable strategy 
(ESS), that is, a strategy that, when adopted by all members of a 
population, cannot be outperformed (or invaded) by any alter-
native strategy. If a strategy A playing against itself has a higher 
payoff than any alternative strategy has against A [payoff(A, 
A) > payoff(alt, A)], that strategy A is an ESS. If the payoffs are 
the same, then A must have a higher payoff against the alternative 
strategy than the alternative strategy has against itself [payoff(A, 
alt) > payoff(alt, alt)] to be an ESS. Because we are interested 
in how error influences the payoffs of many strategies, we used 
Stephens et al. (1995) technique to calculate ESSes with error. This 
technique, however, only applies to strategies that use informa-
tion from the single last interaction. Including earlier interactions 
greatly complicates the analysis, so we limited this analysis to the 
seven strategies that use only the last interaction: ALLC, ALLD, 
GRIM, GTFT, RAND, TFT, WSLS (Table 3). We used the standard 
prisoner’s dilemma matrix (Table 1) and set the probability of 
future interaction to α = 0.9 to approximate the 10 interactions 
used in our experiment. To estimate the payoffs for the remaining 
strategies (CTFT and TF2T), we used an agent-based simulation 
with two agents (one was either CTFT or TF2T and the other 
was one of the nine strategies) playing 10 interactions for 10,000 
replicates. We calculated or simulated the payoffs to each strategy 
against each other strategy with error rates ranging from 0 to 50% 
in 1% increments.
We corroborated the simulation finding with a game- theoretical 
analysis. Figure 6 illustrates the game-theoretical payoffs of all 
strategies categorized by the strategy against which the others play 
(the “population” strategy). When the payoffs of a strategy playing 
against itself exceed the payoffs of all other strategies against it, the 
strategy is an ESS for these error rates. ALLD was an ESS over the 
entire range of error rates. GRIM was an ESS at error rates between 
12 and 18%, validating its performance in the evolutionary simula-
tion around that error rate (Figure 5). CTFT was an ESS at error 
rates between 0 and 17%, although these results are simulated and 
must be viewed with caution. Otherwise, none of the other strate-
gies was evolutionarily stable for this range of parameters.
5 dIscussIon
The goal of this study was to test the psychological plausibility 
of the memory assumption implicitly embedded in models of 
decision strategies for repeated social interactions. These strate-
gies assume that behavior in a social interaction depends on the 
precise recall of a partner’s past actions. We show that human 
participants have great difficulty accurately recalling the previ-
ous actions of simulated partners. Interference associated with 
tracking the behavior of partners degrades memory performance, 
Memory error rate (%)
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FIguRE 5 | Agent-based simulations of error rate effects. When varying 
error rates across a range of values, GRIM, CTFT, TFT, WSLS, and ALLD 
survived with few errors (we do not show strategies with success rates lower 
than 0.05%). At higher rates (e.g., error rates observed in the experiment are 
shaded), however, ALLD and GRIM outperformed the other strategies. The 
proportion of cooperative choices made by all agents in the last generation 
decreased rapidly with increasing error rate.
  If you defected and partner defected, cooperate
  If you cooperated and partner defected, defect
  if you defected and partner cooperated, defect
 Probability of cooperating following T, R, P, S = (0, 1, 1, 0)
Table 3 | Continued
Strategy Description (with computer implementation and game-theoretical definition)
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FIguRE 6 | game-theoretical payoffs of strategies as a function of error rate. For each strategy, we calculated how all strategies perform against that strategy 
over a range of error rates. When the strategy playing against itself has a higher payoff than any other strategy playing against it, this is an evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS). Strategies CTFT and TF2T were simulated rather than analytically calculated.
and having more partners results in worse performance. To assess 
whether the decision strategies proposed in the literature can 
sustain cooperation in the face of error, we conducted simula-
tions of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in which the agents 
sometimes forgot their partner’s past actions. When mapping the 
experimental results onto the simulation results, we see that, in 
our simulation scenario, cooperation is not maintained because 
few cooperative strategies perform well at the error rates shown 
by the experimental data. Instead, defection dominates with these 
estimates of error. These results held even when we used estimates 
of the best memory performance observed in our memory experi-
ments. Of course, the results of the simulations are dependent 
on the strategies included and the parameters used. Nevertheless, 
these findings support the notion that a complete understand-
ing of cooperation requires investigating the underlying cogni-
tion needed to implement those strategies (Stephens et al., 2002; 
Hammerstein, 2003; Stevens and Hauser, 2004; Stevens et al., 2005; 
Furlong and Opfer, 2009).
One limitation of our experiment is the artificial nature of the 
task, a limitation shared by most other cooperation experiments 
in psychology and economics. More realistic social interactions 
might trigger more effective memory performance, so we should 
pay careful attention to how cooperation evolves with error rates 
lower than what we observed. Though aspects of the task may be 
artificial, in some ways, our memory task actually underestimates 
error. For instance, we use rather small group sizes, ranging from 5 
to 15 individuals. Estimates from Christmas card lists in England 
suggest average social network sizes around 125 individuals (Hill 
and Dunbar, 2003). Tracking the behavior of this many individu-
als is quite daunting and likely would greatly increase the error 
rate. Additionally, our study minimizes the influence of events 
outside of the cooperative interactions on memory accuracy. In 
more realistic settings, many more aspects of real life may interfere 
with accurate memory. We asked participants to recall behavior 
after rather short delays and with only a few intervening events. 
In our day-to-day lives, we constantly encode memories that may 
interfere with our ability to recall, with retention intervals extend-
ing into days, weeks, months, or even years between interactions. 
More realistic situations with larger numbers of social partners 
and longer time delays between interactions could actually make 
memory worse than that observed in our study. Thus, our task 
may be too difficult in some ways and too easy in others, but in 
either case, the strategies in question need to track behavior with 
an exquisite memory.
Most empirical studies of the prisoner’s dilemma involve 
repeated interactions with the same opponent. We created a more 
realistic situation by including multiple partners and interleav-
ing interactions among partners (Winkler et al., 2008). A further 
improvement might be to offer a skewed interaction pattern. Rather 
than meeting all partners the same number of times, participants 
could have interacted more frequently with some partners than 
others, a pattern we observe in natural social encounters (Pachur 
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et al., 2011). These patterns of contact have interesting implica-
tions for cooperation because the frequency of contact influences 
the expected time between contacts. Thus, retention intervals vary 
for tracking the previous behavior of more versus less frequently 
contacted social partners.
Finally, in our task, we attempted to make the cooperation and 
defection events equally salient, but real cooperative interactions are 
much more heterogeneous: opening a door for someone will not be 
remembered in the same way as cheating on a spouse. The salience 
or magnitude of costs or benefits of the cooperative or defection 
event likely contributes to the retention of the memory (Mealey 
et al., 1996; Rankin and Eggimann, 2009). Yet, our analysis with 
lower-error rates (forgetting function based on the five- partner 
condition) still showed minimal cooperation rates, indicating 
that better memory performance is not enough to sustain coop-
eration – near perfect memory is required. More importantly, we 
designed a task that is ecological valid for TFT and the other deci-
sion strategies under investigation. These strategies do not invoke 
emotional salience or differential encoding of behavior depending 
on the magnitude of costs or benefits. They all simply store a binary 
value (cooperate or defect) for each partner. Adding salience and 
magnitude effects means developing and testing new strategies, a 
path we fully endorse.
How might we circumvent the problem of memory in coop-
eration? Or, put another way, why do we see cooperation in 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma situations? There are at least two 
possibilities. The first is methodological. Many studies of the 
prisoner’s dilemma have participants play against a single part-
ner repeatedly. This may facilitate cooperation both because it 
provides much experience with a partner and because it limits 
the memory load associated with the more realistic scenario of 
tracking multiple partners. The second reason why we may see 
cooperation in these tasks is that people are using different strat-
egies than those currently proposed in the literature. One pos-
sibility is a kind of meta-strategy in which people use TFT when 
they can remember past interactions and use another strategy 
when they cannot remember. Though this meta-strategy has not 
been investigated theoretically, people could use something like 
this to reciprocate. Alternatively, people may be using a longer-
term reciprocal strategy. Instead of relying solely on the most 
recent behavior when cooperating, they may build a reputation 
for partners, accounting for experience over several interactions 
(Roberts, 2008). People may implement reciprocal strategies that 
classify partners into types instead of track all individual choices. 
Though we focused here exclusively on direct experience with 
partners, people also likely use indirect experience by observing 
third-party  interactions to build an image score for potential 
partners (Roberts, 2008; Rankin and Eggimann, 2009). Thus, 
instead of tracking individual interactions, people may encode 
more general summaries of behavior, drawn from both personal 
experience and observing other interactions.
Rather than test how people actually make cooperative decisions, 
our intention here was to test whether the current decision strate-
gies provide a suitable framework for exploring cooperation. We 
suggest that, though these models have proven valuable in inves-
tigating cooperation for the last 30 years, they do not accurately 
reflect underlying cognition. Humans certainly use reciprocal 
strategies when cooperating, but they likely do not use strategies 
like TFT and its relatives. Our results suggest that they simply can-
not use these strategies because the memory load is too great. To 
examine the types of reciprocal strategies that humans and other 
animals use, we must embed what we know about memory into 
new realistic cooperative strategies. Building psychology into these 
models is a crucial next step in better understanding the nature 
of cooperation.
acknowledGments
We thank Gregor Caregnato for testing the participants, Natalie 
Ebner for allowing us to use her face photos, Sebastian Scholz 
for translating our NetLogo code into Pascal, and Mario Fific, 
Henrik Olsson, and Max Wolf for comments on an early version 
of the manuscript. Funding for the project was provided by the 
Max Planck Society. This project was approved by the Max Planck 
Institute for Human Development Ethics Commission.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science  January 2011 | Volume 1 | Article 235 | 10
Stevens et al. Forgetting constrains cooperative strategies
Conflict of Interest Statement: The 
authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or 
financial relationships that could be con-
strued as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 13 August 2010; Paper pend-
ing published: 01 October 2010; accepted: 
10 December 2010; published online: 04 
January 2011.
Citation: Stevens JR, Volstorf J, Schooler 
LJ and Rieskamp J (2011) Forgetting 
constrains the emergence of cooperative 
 decision strategies. Front. Psychology 1:235. 
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00235
This article was submitted to Frontiers in 
Cognitive Science, a specialty of Frontiers 
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2011 Stevens, Volstorf, 
Schooler and Rieskamp. This is an open-
access article subject to an exclusive license 
agreement between the authors and the 
Frontiers Research Foundation, which 
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original authors and source are credited.
straints on the evolution of coopera-
tion. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 60–65.
Todd, P. M., and Gigerenzer, G. 
(2007). “Mechanisms of ecological 
rationality: heuristics and envi-
ronments that make us smart,” in 
Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology, eds R. I. M. Dunbar 
and L. Barrett (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 197–210.
Wickelgren, W. A. (1974). Single-trace 
fragility theory of memory dynam-
ics. Mem. Cogn. 2, 775–780.
Winkler, I., Jonas, K., and Rudolph, U. 
(2008). On the usefulness of memory 
skills in social interactions: modify-
ing the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. J. 
Conflict Resolut. 52, 375–384.
Wixted, J. T., and Carpenter, S. K. (2007). 
The Wickelgren power law and the 
Ebbinghaus savings function. Psychol. 
Sci. 18, 133–134.
Wu, J., and Axelrod, R. (1995). How 
to cope with noise in the Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. J. Conflict Resolut. 
39, 183–189.
Rudolph, U., Bohm, R., and Lummer, M. 
(2007). Ein Vorname sagt mehr als 1000 
Worte: zur sozialen Wahrnehmung 
von Vornamen. Z. Sozialpsychol. 38, 
17–31.
Sarkar, D. (2008). Lattice: Multivariate 
Data Visualization with R. New York: 
Springer.
Schneider, W., Eschmann, A., and 
Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-Prime 
Reference Guide . Pittsburgh: 
Psychology Software Tools, Inc.
Stephens, D. W., McLinn, C. M., and 
Stevens, J. R. (2002). Discounting and 
reciprocity in an iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma. Science 298, 2216–2218.
Stephens, D. W., Nishimura, K., and Toyer, 
K. B. (1995). Error and discounting 
in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. J. 
Theor. Biol. 176 , 457–469.
Stevens, J. R., Cushman, F. A., and Hauser, 
M. D. (2005). Evolving the psychologi-
cal mechanisms for cooperation. Annu. 
Rev. Ecol. Evol. Systemat. 36, 499–518.
Stevens, J. R., and Hauser, M. D. (2004). 
Why be nice? Psychological con-
Regularities in social contact dynam-
ics reflected in memory and decision 
making,” in Simple Heuristics in a Social 
World, eds R. Hertwig, U. Hoffrage, and 
the ABC Research Group (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), in press.
R Development Core Team. (2010). R: A 
Language and Environment for Statistical 
Computing. Vienna: R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing. Available at: 
http://www.r-project.org.
Rankin, D. J., and Eggimann, F. (2009). 
The evolution of judgement bias in 
indirect reciprocity. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. 
B 276, 1339–1345.
Rapoport, A., and Chammah, A. N. 
(1965). Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in 
Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.
Rieskamp, J., and Todd, P. (2006). The 
evolution of cooperative strategies for 
asymmetric social interactions. Theory 
Decis. 60, 69–111.
Roberts, G. (2008). Evolution of direct and 
indirect reciprocity. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. 
B 275, 173–179.
www.frontiersin.org January 2011 | Volume 1 | Article 235 | 11
Stevens et al. Forgetting constrains cooperative strategies
Press “k” for “cooperate” or “n” for “not cooperate.” You will 
have 10 s to respond. If you wait longer than 10 s, the question 
will be skipped.
After each response, you will learn whether you were correct. 
Thereafter you will see what the partner decides to do this time. In 
the example below, Natalie does not cooperate this time.
This is now the action that you should try to keep in mind. The 
task always is to recall the last action for the partner. Then there will 
follow the retrieval, feedback and new action for the next partner 
and so on.
appendIx
partIcIpant InstructIons
Below is a translation from German of the participant 
instructions.
Instructions
In this experiment, you will repeatedly interact with a number 
of hypothetical partners. For each interaction, your partner will 
choose either to cooperate or not cooperate. Your task is to recall the 
last action for each partner.
To give you a concrete example of what this might mean, imagine 
that you repeatedly go out to dinner with each partner. At the end of 
the meal, you each must decide individually whether to contribute 
to a tip for the waiter. If your partner tips, this would be an instance 
of cooperating, but if your partner does not contribute to the tip, 
then this is not cooperating.
In this task, we will assess how well you remember whether each 
partner cooperated or not the last time you interacted.
Procedure. First you will be shown for each partner whether he/
she cooperates or not. You should try to remember each partner’s 
action. In the example below, Natalie cooperates.
After observing all of the partners’ actions one after the other, it 
follows the retrieval of the actions of the individual partners. For 
this purpose you will meet each partner again but not necessarily 
in the same order as in the beginning. Each time you will be asked 
whether the displayed partner cooperated or not the last time that 
you interacted with him/her.
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partIcIpant QuestIonnaIre
Below is a translation from German of the participant 
questionnaire.
1. Do you know one/some of the depicted persons?
2. Did you associate memories of a/some certain person/s with 
one/some of the used names?
3. Of 10 decisions that you made how often did you guess on 
average?
4. Of 10 of your partner’s actions how often, you think, did the 
interaction partners cooperate on average?
5. Did you pursue a certain strategy for memorizing the partner’s 
actions? If you did, please describe the strategy you used.
6. What did you do when you could not remember the action 
from the previous round?
7. Do you have comments or suggestions?
Please respond as accurately as possible. You will receive 5 cents 
for every correct response (in addition to your show-up fee of 5 
euros).
Altogether you can receive an additional payment of 8 euros 
on average. For incorrect responses or skipped questions, you will 
receive no payment.
Generally. For this experiment your partners will be grouped, such 
that you will repeatedly interact with the same partners before 
moving on to a new group of partners. Each group will have a dif-
ferent number of partners which you will interact with a different 
number of times. After you complete a group, you can have a short 
break before beginning the next group. The whole task should last 
about 1.5 h.
You will begin with a practice phase in which you can see how 
the task works without earning money. If you have any questions, 
please ask the experimenter. If you are ready to begin the practice 
phase, please press <space bar> on the computer keyboard.
